Abstract A (g; b) key distribution scheme allows conferences of g users to generate secret keys, such that disjoint coalitions of b users cannot gain any information on the generated key (in the information theoretic sense). In this work, we study the relationships between communication and space e ciency of key distribution schemes. We prove that communication does not help in the context of unrestricted schemes. On the other hand, we show that for restricted schemes, which are secure only when used by a limited number of conferences, communication can substantially improve the space e ciency. We also present lower bounds on the space e ciency of restricted schemes.
Introduction
In various multiuser systems, the need for generating a secret, common to a subset of the users, arises occasionally. Such key can be used, for example, in establishing a secure private key cryptosystem among the members of the subset. A non-communicating key distribution scheme for conferences of size g which is secure against any disjoint coalition of b users is denoted (g; b)-scheme. This is a scheme where an o -line server initially distributes n pieces of information, one per user. Each user receives his piece discretely. After this initial distribution takes place, the users can reconstruct keys in a secure fashion. That is:
1. Every member of a \good" conference (set) G of g users can reconstruct a key from his piece (and the conference identity). This reconstruction requires no communication (either among users or with the server). The key that every user in G reconstructs is the same, and is called the key of the conference G.
2. Every \bad" coalition B of b users does not gain any information on the key of any disjoint conference G.
It might help the reader to remember that the size of conferences is denoted by g which stands for \good" users, and the size of coalitions is denoted by b which stands for \bad" users.
It is clear that non-communicating schemes require initial distribution of pieces of information to the users. The (space) e ciency of a scheme is measured by the cardinality of the domain of pieces. The cardinality is a function of the cardinality of the domain of possible keys, jSj, the number of users, n, the size of conferences g, and the size of coalitions b. Blom 1] was the rst to consider non-communicating schemes for conference of size 2 and coalitions of size b. He presented an e cient (2; b) scheme, based on MDS codes.
The pieces in Blom's scheme are taken from a domain of cardinality jSj b+1 (where S is the domain of keys). Matsumoto . For large values of g and b, this expression is quite large. However, using entropy arguments, Blundo et. al. 3] prove a tight lower bound on the cardinality of the domain of pieces. Therefore, their scheme is space-optimal. In this work, we apply direct arguments (no entropy) to prove the same lower bound. Our proof has two advantages. First, in our opinion, it is more intuitive and less technical. Second, it actually applies to a weaker notion of security, thereby providing a stronger result. This stronger result is used in proving our lower bound on communicating schemes which is described in the next paragraph. Other works dealing with non-communicating schemes in our setting are 4, 5, 6, 7] .
The large lower bound (for big conferences and coalitions) raises the question whether communication could be of help in reducing the size of pieces. Communication has some subtle implications on the security requirement (see section 5 for details). Just like the non-communicating schemes, we require that even if conferences communicate in order to generate keys, these keys remain secure with respect to disjoint coalitions of size b. Since no secure channels among users can be assumed, communication takes place via a broadcast media. One problem which arises is that the communication of one conference could leak information on the keys of other conferences. Therefore, we require that even if a \bad" coalition heard the communication of all the conferences, the coalition does not gain any information on keys of (disjoint) conferences. We argue that this is the right security requirement for communicating schemes. We prove that, regrettably, such unrestricted communicating schemes require pieces from a domain as large as non-communicating schemes.
This negative result motivates the introduction of restricted communicating schemes. These schemes can be used only for a limited number of conferences, whose identity is not known beforehand. We construct an e cient one-time secure scheme, where the size of the domain of pieces is of cardinality jSj
. This is a substantial improvement over the jSj g+b?1 cardinality in the one-time secure communicating scheme of 3]. (The fact that this scheme is only one-time secure was not mentioned in 3]). Following 3], our schemes are noninteractive: Each user sends messages which depend only on his piece of information and not on messages received from other users. Other, less e cient, one time secure communicating schemes are presented in 8, 9] . We prove a lower bound of jSj 1+bb=(g?1)c on the cardinality of the domain of pieces in every one time (g; b)-scheme. We use copies of the one-time scheme to construct a scheme which is secure for conferences. The cardinality of the domain of pieces in this scheme is jSj
. We show that the domain of pieces of every user in a communicating (g; b) scheme, which is secure for conferences, is at least max . Hence, the dependence on of the domain of pieces in our scheme cannot be completely avoided.
We contrast our results with known ones in the computational model, where attacks of coalitions are restricted to probabilistic polynomial time computations. Di e and Hellman 10], in their pioneering work on public key cryptography, introduced a communicating scheme of key generation for conferences of size two 1 . This communicating scheme requires no server and no pieces. In this scheme a given communication uniquely determines the key, but it is (presumably) intractable for a third user to compute the key from the communication (of course, in our setting this information enables other users to nd the conference 1 Let p be a prime number, and let be a primitive element in the eld GF(p). User i (respectively j) chooses a random number r i 2 GF(p) (respectively r j ) and sends the message m i = ri (respectively m j = rj ). The joint key of users i and j is ri rj , which i easily computes from m j and r i using the equality m ri j = ri rj . key). On the other hand, even in the computational model, a non-communicating scheme requires pieces taken from a domain which is at least as large as the domain of keys. So in the computational model, communication does reduce the size of pieces, up to complete elimination. Fiat and Naor 11] present a non-communicating (n ? 1; 1)-scheme in the computational model. In their scheme, which is based on the assumed intractability of extracting root modulo composites (RSA), the domain of pieces has the same cardinality as the domain of keys. Recall that in the computationally unbounded model a non-communicating (n; 1)-scheme requires that the domain of pieces is at least of cardinality jSj n . The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give formal de nition of communicating and non-communicating schemes. In Section 3 we present our proof of the lower bound for weak non-communicating schemes. In Section 4 we use this result to prove a lower bound for unrestricted communicating schemes. In Section 5 we de ne restricted communicating schemes. In Section 6 we prove lower bounds for restricted communicating schemes, and in Section 7 we describe some e cient constructions.
De nition of Key Distribution Schemes
In this section, we present formal de nition of communicating and non-communicating key distribution schemes. We start with the communicating schemes.
De nition 2.1: Let f1; : : : ; ng be a set of users, g and b be positive integers such that g + b n, S be a set of keys, and P be an a-priori probability distribution on S. Let R be a random input of the server and the random inputs of the users determine the pieces and the communication then describing the key as a function of the random inputs is appropriate.
unrestricted security requirement Every (\bad") coalition B of cardinality b, having their pieces and random inputs, and knowing the conversations of all possible conferences, does not gain any information on the key of any disjoint subset G 0 (i.e. G 0 \ B = ;). That is, for every vector of pieces hu 1 ; : : : ; u n i which is distributed with positive probability, every set of random inputsr B to coalition members, every possible key s 2 S, and every set of possible consistent conversations C 1 ; : : :; C ( The probability is taken over r { the random input of the server, and overr { the random inputs of all the users for all conferences;r B is the restriction ofr to the coalition B.
The security property implies that for every conference G of cardinality g, it holds that Pr s G (r;r G ) = s ] = P (s) , where the probability is taken over r, the random input of the server,r, andr G the random inputs of the users of G. In other words, the conference key of G is a random variable, which is distributed according to the a-priori probability distribution on the keys. It is not guaranteed that keys of di erent conferences are independent random variables. The security requirement does imply some independence between the keys. For example, it is true that every b + 1 keys are independent. Otherwise, there are b users knowing the rst b keys, and therefore gain some information on the (b + 1) key of a disjoint conference. In the rest of this paper we assume that the a-priori probability of each key is positive. That is, for every key s 2 S it holds that P (s) > 0.
We now de ne non-communicating schemes, which are a special case of communicating schemes.
De nition 2.2: A non communicating (g; b) key distribution scheme with n users and domain of keys S is a (g; b) scheme, in which every set G of cardinality g can generate a key which depends only on the vector of pieces (and not on any communication), and every user i 2 G can reconstruct G's key from his piece. In this case the random input of the server determines the key of every set G. That is, s G is only a function of r. The security requirement reduces to:
Pr s G 0 (r) = s jĵ 2B ( Uj (r) = u j ) ] = P (s) :
We now consider a weakening of the security requirement. Instead of requiring that the conditional probability (given any pieces of a bad set B) of every key equals the a-priory probability, we will only require that this conditional probability is positive. We claim that this security requirement is not reasonable, since every \bad" coalition B could gain a lot of information. The reason we do de ne weak schemes is because we show that the lower bounds on the size of the pieces hold even for these weak schemes. To simplify this discussion, we will only consider non-communicating weak schemes.
De nition 2.3 : A weak non-communicating (g; b) key distribution scheme is a noncommunicating (g; b) scheme in which the security property is relaxed:
weak security property Let B be a coalition of b (bad) users, and let G be a conference of g (good) users, such that G \ B = ;. Then the users in B, having their pieces, cannot rule out any key of G. In other words, for every vector of piecesũ = hu 1 ; : : :; u n i which is dealt with positive probability, and every possible key s 2 S, there exists a vector of pieces u 0 that agrees withũ on the pieces of B, but the key of the set G according to the vectorũ 0 is s. Formally,
where the probability is taken over the random input of the server.
It is obvious that unrestricted non-communicating schemes are a special case of weak non-communicating schemes. Therefore, every lower bound for weak schemes implies the same lower bound for unrestricted non-communicating schemes.
3 A Lower Bound for Non-Communicating Schemes Blundo et. al. 3] prove a tight lower bound on the size of the pieces in every noncommunicating key distribution scheme. Their proof is based on the entropy function, and, in our opinion, does not reveal the intuition behind this lower bound. We present a simpler proof of this lower bound, which is not based on entropy. Furthermore, in our proof we only use the weak security requirement. That is, even weak (g; b) schemes, where the entropy of the keys may be very low, must have large domain of pieces. Thus, our proof yields a stronger result than the lower bound of 3]. We use this stronger result in the sequel. Hence for everys 2 S`, there is a vector of piecesũ for the users, in which the vector of reconstructed keys for the sets G 1 ; : : :; G`iss. Since user 1 computes the keys of the sets G 1 ; : : : ; G`from his piece, it follows that his piece must be di erent for every pair of di erent vectors of keys for the sets G 1 ; : : :; G`. There are jSj`possible vectors of keys, therefore there are at least jSj`di erent pieces for user 1. That is, jU 1 j jSj`= jSj ( g+b?1 g?1 ) , as claimed. We remark that if the keys of all sets were independent random variables then using the same ideas of this proof, we can prove a lower bound of jSj ( n g?1 ) . Another observation is that we can consider a key distribution scheme in which only some pre-de ned subsets of size g can reconstruct a key. Our proof actually supplies a lower bound for this setting as well. ) with uniform a-priori distribution on the keys (provided that jSj n and jSj is a prime power). So the lower bound is tight (except for small domains of keys).
Removing Communication from Unrestricted Schemes
In this section we show how to transform an unrestricted communicating scheme into a weak non-communicating key distribution scheme, without changing the domain of pieces. Therefore, the lower bound on the cardinality of the domain of pieces applies to unrestricted communicating schemes as well. Proof: The idea of the proof is to x, for every set G of g users, a possible communication C G (i.e. one that is exchanged with positive probability when G communicates in order to generate a conference key). The vector of all these communications is public knowledge. Now the server deals only vectors of pieces that are consistent with all the communications C G 's.
When a member of a set G wishes to determine a conference key, he applies the reconstruction function to his piece and the xed communication C G . This way, no communication is required. In the rest of proof, we show rst how to choose communications for di erent conferences such that they are consistent among themselves. This implies the existence of vectors of pieces that are consistent with all the communications. Once this is done, it is clear that the non-communicating scheme has the reconstruction property. We then prove that the resulting non-communicating scheme has the weak security property. Therefore it is a weak non-communicating (g; b) scheme. . But the domain of the pieces in the non-communicating scheme is not larger than that of the communicating scheme. Therefore, the lower bound on the size of the pieces applies to the original communicating scheme as well.
To complete the proof, we rst show how to choose a set of communications C G (for all G's) in a consistent way. To do this, we rst x an arbitrary vector of piecesũ which is dealt by the server in the original scheme with positive probability. We also x the local random input of each user. Each communication C G is the one determined when the users of G hold pieces fromũ, and have the xed random inputs. It is clear thatũ is consistent with all these conversations. The server in the new scheme chooses at random a vector of pieces that is consistent with the communications. That is, the server chooses a vector of 2 In this proof we do not de ne the probability distribution under which the server distributes the consistent vectors of pieces. We only require that every consistent vector is distributed with positive probability. It is possible to de ne a probability distribution on the consistent vectors, such that the induced (g; b) scheme will have the unrestricted security property.
pieces from the (non-empty) set of vectors of piecesṽ for which there exists a vector of local random inputsr for the users, such that every conference G of g users, holding the pieces ofṽ, and having the random inputsr G , communicate C G (wherer G is the restriction ofr to the members of G).
We now show that the resulting non-communicating scheme is weakly secure. Let G be any conference of cardinality g, and B be a disjoint coalition of cardinality b. By the security property of the communicating scheme, it follows that for every vector of pieces that is consistent with the xed conversations, and every key s 2 S, there exists a vector of pieces which is consistent with the given pieces of the users in B, such that the reconstructed key of conference G equals s. That is, the non-communicating scheme has the weak security property, as claimed.
We can de ne the notion of weak security for unrestricted communicating schemes in a similar manner to De nition 2.3. The lower bound of Theorem 4.1 is also applicable to such weak unrestricted communicating schemes.
De nition of Restricted Communicating Schemes
By Theorem 4.1, communication cannot decrease the size of the pieces of information given to the users in key distribution schemes. In order to decrease the size of the pieces of information, we relax the security requirement. We require that the key distribution schemes should be secure only for a limited number of conferences. Which conference will generate a key is not known a-priori, so the distributed pieces should accommodate any combination of conferences (up to the limit on their number). We will show that if this limit is relatively small then the size of the pieces can be substantially reduced. For example, if the scheme is only required to be secure for a single conference, then for g = b = n=2 we present a scheme whose domain of pieces is of cardinality jSj 4 , regardless of n. Recall that for unrestricted schemes with these parameters, the cardinality of the domain of pieces is jSj 2 (n) (Theorem 4.1). Before going any further, we remark that the notion of key distribution schemes restricted to a limited number of conferences is meaningful only with respect to communicating schemes. For non-communicating schemes, the generation of a conference key does not add any information to any user (either in the conference or not). Therefore a one-time secure non-communicating scheme would also be secure in the unrestricted sense, and no saving can be expected. On the other hand, the communication in communicating schemes is heard by all users (not only conference members), and could reduce the uncertainty of the remaining pieces. After su ciently many communications take place, no uncertainty is left, and the pieces become useless for additional conferences. This implies that the amount of initial secrecy in restricted communicating schemes can be smaller than that of unrestricted schemes. The proof that unrestricted communicating schemes and unrestricted non-communicating schemes have the same space e ciency (Theorem 4.1) is not applicable for restricted schemes. It is indeed possible, for example, to transform a one-time secure communicating scheme into a non-communicating scheme, using the technique of Theorem 4.1. However, this would yield a non-communicating scheme which is secure only with respect to a single xed conference, depending on the one initiating the communication.
We start with the precise de nition of -restricted key distribution scheme. Then we prove fairly close upper and lower bounds on the size of the pieces in such schemes. The probability is taken over r { the random input of the server, andr { the random inputs of all the users for all conferences;r B is the restriction ofr to the coalition B. We denote 1-restricted scheme by one-time scheme.
Lower Bounds for Restricted Communicating Schemes
In this section, we present lower bounds on the cardinality of the domain of pieces in restricted key distribution schemes. We rst give a simple lower bound for every -restricted (g; b) scheme , there are sets that contain user i. Choosing sets containing user i as the pre-de ned sets, we apply Lemma 3.2 to the transformed scheme. By this lemma the cardinality of the domain of pieces of user i in the transformed scheme at least jSj . By the transformation, the cardinality of the domain of pieces in the transformed scheme is at most the cardinality of the domain of pieces in the -restricted secure scheme. Therefore, the cardinality of the domain of pieces of every user in the -restricted scheme is at least jSj .
We now improve the previous lower bound for schemes in which (b=g) g . The proof of this lower bound uses entropy and mutual information. For de nitions of these information theoretic terms, the reader can refer to 12, 13, 14] . In the proof we use the following proposition of Maurer 15] and Ahlswede and Csiszar 16] . Its context is a system where two (coin ipping) users, each with private piece of information, execute a protocol by communicating over a broadcast channel. After the execution of the protocol, the two users generate a common key, such that a third user overhearing all the communication does not have any information on the key. In this circumstances, the conditional mutual information (measuring the information known to the two users but not to the third user) of the initial pieces is at least the entropy (uncertainty) of the generated key. The proposition is proven by showing that the mutual information of any random variable held by the two users cannot be increased after a conversation on a broadcast channel. In the proposition Ui is the random variable which denotes the piece of user i, and S is a random variable which denotes the key. , where U 1 is the domain of pieces of user 1 in the scheme U . We start with a one-time (2; b) scheme U . For every i, we construct a new scheme with 3 users. In the new scheme user 1 receives U1 , the piece of users 1 in U , user 2 receives Ui , the piece of user i in U , and user 3 receives the pieces of users i+1; : : :; b+2 from U . In the new scheme users 1 and 2 can generate the key of the old users f1; ig. Since user 3 receives at most b pieces of the old scheme, he has no information on the generated key. Therefore, we are in the scenario of Proposition 6.2. We conclude that for every i ( It holds that H ( U1 ) log jU 1 j, and since we assume uniform distribution on S then H (S) = log jSj. Thus, log jU 1 j H ( U1 ) (b + 1) H (S) = (b + 1) log jSj ; which yields the claimed bound jU 1 j jSj b+1 . The proof of Lemma 6.3 (with respect to the domain U 1 ) does not require that every pair of users should be able to reconstruct a key. It only requires that user 1 and every other user can generate a key. It is also interesting to notice that any scheme meeting this lower bound satis es H ( U1 j U2 : : : Ub+2 ) = 0, so every b + 1 users can reconstruct the pieces of all the other users. We now use Lemma 6.3 to prove a lower bound for every conference size g and various values of . , then jSj jSj Proof: For clarity of the exposition, we rst assume that n = g+b. In this case let jSj = q g for some positive number q 2 (not necessary a prime power). For every pair of users the server chooses two independent random strings from f0; (mod q) if i > j. Therefore, every random string is used only once. Hence, the messages that are sent are all uniformly distributed and independent of the conference key of G and the pieces of any coalition B with b users (provided G \ B = ;). This implies that the scheme is secure.
We now describe our communicating one-time (g; b)-scheme for every n g + b. The scheme is similar to the case n = g + b, with one change. To guarantee that the scheme is secure, we make sure that from the point of view of every coalition of size at most b the pads used in the generation of a key are uniformly distributed and independent of each other. On the other hand, we do not require that all 2 n 2 strings that are given to the users are totally independent. It su ces that the server deals vectors of pieces according to the non-communicating (2; g + b ? 2) scheme of Blom 1] for n users, with keys taken from a domain of cardinality jSj 2=g = q 2 . The pads used in the generation of a key are the keys of this scheme. Before we discuss the security of the scheme, we consider its e ciency. In Blom's scheme the cardinality of the domain of keys has to be at least n { the number of users. Hence, we require that q 2 n. Furthermore, in Blom's scheme the domain is a nite eld, so q has to be a prime-power. We use the non-communicating (2; 2) scheme is uniformly distributed and independent of the pieces of coalition B of b users. Since these keys are used as one-time pads, it follows that no information is leaked on the generated key, and therefore the scheme is secure. The formal proof that Claim 7.2 implies the security property of the one time scheme appears in Claim A.1 in Appendix A. Claim 7.2: Let U be a non-communicating (2; g + b ? 2)-scheme with a-priori distribution P on a key domain S. Let G and B be sets of g and b users respectively, such that G\B = ;, P (s i ) : (1) Proof: To simplify the notations, we denote t = Therefore, to prove Equation (1) (and therefore the lemma) it is enough to prove that for every k, where 1 k t, it holds that: Pr s k (r) = s k jk +1 i t s i (r) = s i^ĵ 2B Uj (r) = u j ] = P (s k ) : (2) That is, the key s k (r) is independent of the other keys and the pieces of the users in B. To prove Equation (2), we partition the conditional probability space into disjoint subspaces, and prove this equality for every subspace. Thus, Equation (2) will hold for the original conditional space. The partition of the conditional space is according to the pieces of the g ? 2 users in G n G k . These pieces determine the keys of all the G i except G k . Without loss of generality G k = f1; 2g. Letṽ = hv 3 ; : : :; v g+b i, be any vector of pieces that is distributed with positive probability, such that:
For every j 2 B it holds that u j = v j .
For every i, such that k +1 i t, it holds that the key of G i reconstructed according to the pieces ofṽ is s i .
Since the cardinality of B G n G k is g + b ? 2 then the security property of the (2; g + b ? 2) scheme guarantees that Pr s k (r) = s k jĵ We have constructed a one time scheme with the desired parameters, and have proven its security. Hence Lemma 7.1 follows.
One property of our communicating scheme is that it uses only one-way communication. The messages of di erent members of G do not depend on other messages. Another property of our scheme is that for a xed b, the cardinality of the domain of pieces of each user is a monotonically decreasing function of g. This feature stands in contrast to unrestricted (g; b) schemes, where the cardinality of the domain of pieces of each user is a monotonically increasing function of g.
In the proof of Lemma 7.1, the conference key of G (i.e. s = s 1 s 2 : : : s j ) is distributed uniformly in S. It is possible to change this a-priori probability distribution on the keys. One way to achieve this goal is to rst generate a key s as in the previous way. Then an arbitrary user chooses the real key k for the conference according to any desired distribution. The user sends the message (k + s) mod q.
We remark that the one time scheme cannot be reused. For example, if users f1; 2g are members of two conferences G 1 ; G 2 then the part of the keys generated by them in the two conferences will be known to all the users in G 1 G 2 . To extend our scheme to a -secure one, we use independent copies of the one time scheme. The generation of a key for each conference is done using a di erent copy of the one time scheme. Since the copies are independent, each conference does not add any information to other conferences. Hence, the security of the one-time scheme implies the security of the -restricted scheme. We summarize this construction in the next theorem. . This -restricted communicating schemes requires that the users hold a counter, which is incremented each time a conference key is generated. Given such a reliable counter, active attack by users sending messages deviating from the protocol, do not reveal information on di erent conferences. Such attack could only prevent the generation of the present conference key. Our scheme does not work in the absence of a reliable counter. It is an open question to construct an e cient -restricted scheme (for > 1) in which the keys and messages do not depend on a counter or any other history of previous conferences. 
